All of these rules, policies, and actions can be performed for a variety of reasons. can be justified by various considerations. If they are justified solely because the person concerned would be better or less harmed by the rule, the policy, etc., and the person concerned would prefer not to be treated that way, we have a case of paternalism. Their definition of paternalism is very weak in that it considers far more paternalistic actions than would be the case in almost all traditional definitions of paternalism. If, in order to decide on any of the above issues, a normative question has to be decided, for example, does someone have a right to information, then the concept is not purely descriptive. Ultimately, the question of how to refine the conditions and which conditions to use is a matter of philosophical judgment. The term “paternalism,” as used in ordinary contexts, may be too amorphous to think about certain normative issues. You have to go for hypothesis-based analysis, which is very useful for thinking about a particular set of problems. One analysis could be done in relation to doctors and patients and another in relation to whether the state should ban unhealthy foods. Another theoretical basis is (moral) contractualism. If there are cases of justified paternalism, they are justified on the basis that we (all of us) would accept such interference, provided it is properly known and motivated.
For example, it could be argued that since we know we have depression, we would all agree on anti-suicidal interventions, at least in the short term, to determine if we have such a condition and try to cure it. More generally, we could accept what Feinberg called “soft paternalism.” It is the view that if we do not act entirely voluntarily, it is permissible to intervene to provide information or point out gaps in our reason, but if we then make a voluntary decision, it must be respected. Or we could accept being forced to wear seat belts, knowing that we are willing to reduce future benefits for current benefits. The justification here is neither consequentialist nor simply based on the preservation of autonomy. On the contrary, both types of reasoning, as well as others, can be taken into account in determining what we would reasonably agree with. One problem with many flare-ups is what the person getting kicked knows about the push. In the cafeteria example, students know that food has been placed on different Sehebenen. In this sense, the impetus for them is transparent. It`s not like subliminal messages where they`re not aware of the messages being addressed to them. Let`s call the nudges, which are transparent in this sense, close pushes. Framing effects: It is one of the most confirmed results of empirical decision theory that subjects` decisions are influenced by different types of information presentation. For example, when it comes to deciding whether to undergo surgery that can cure one`s illness but has the capacity to induce death, as desired, is influenced by whether one says (A) or (B): After all, moral paternalism differs from welfare paternalism on the basis of the type of good intended for the person, whose freedom is restricted.
Local blue laws (laws prohibiting certain secular activities on Sundays) have been introduced in some congregations to promote a moral standard of sobriety, rest, and church attendance on Sundays, whether or not members of those communities want to observe Sunday as a religious day or are considered morally corrupt. Coercive measures imposed to promote the moral good are different from others – such as speed limits for motorists, vaccinations for schoolchildren, or architectural design standards in neighborhoods – designed to promote the general well-being of citizens. The principle of legal paternalism justifies state coercion to protect individuals from self-inflicted harm or, in its extreme version, to guide them, whether they like it or not, for their own good. Parents can be expected to justify interfering with their children`s lives (e.g., telling them what to eat and when to sleep) on the grounds that “Daddy knows better than anyone.” Legal paternalism seems to imply that, since the state can often know the interests of individual citizens better than the citizens themselves, it presents itself as the permanent guardian of those interests in Loco Parentis. Expressed in this brutal way, paternalism seems to be an absurd doctrine. If adults are treated like children, they will come in time to be like children. Without the right to decide for themselves, they will soon lose the power of rational judgment and decision. Even children should not be “treated like children” at some point, otherwise they will never acquire the attitude and capacity of responsible adults. If the use of psychiatry to establish diminished responsibility is legitimate, and if the philosophical interpretations of madness proposed by philosophers like Fingarette are correct, then we have ingredients for a doctor-patient analogy and a parent-child relationship. However, the question arises. If some are mentally ill like children who do not have the capacity to make reasoned judgments, are they like normal or retarded children? The answer is crucial because the parent-child relationship involves the responsibility and obligation to do more than simply restrict freedom to avoid harming oneself. There is an obligation to promote the rational and moral development of the child.
The paternalistic model would therefore not justify mere custody unless there is good reason to believe that it also implies that the analogue of the patient is a child incapable of developing rational skills. This reinforces the commitment to a goal that many in psychiatric practice consider essential: a contribution to the patient`s capacity for self-determination. It is also consistent with a responsibility that is often overlooked in medical practice: the responsibility to educate. A recent manual designed to facilitate the fulfillment of this obligation [4] quotes William Osier: “It is not a vain challenge that we physicians issue to the world when we affirm that our mission is of the highest and noblest, not only in the cure of diseases, but in the education of people in the laws of health. Why can anyone think that at least the state will never do this? One might think this because one has different beliefs about the impossibility of actually doing good for people against their will, or because one thinks that while it is possible to do good, in reality it is not compatible with a normative norm that should prevail. There is a characteristic of many impulses that must be taken into account, which, although not inherent in the concept of a boost, is often present in the background as a crucial feature. One author actually links these frameworks to the definition of libertarian paternalism. Suppose we start from the assumption that paternalism is bad.
The question arises as to what, if any, circumstances the presumption can be overcome. Possible answers are “in no case”, “in certain circumstances” and “in all circumstances”. Restricting the freedom of the individual to prevent him from harming himself is called paternalism. It is clear that Mill was violent against the paternalistic interference of a government in a civilized society. This relationship between society and the individual is based on the parent-child model – as opposed to avoiding harming others, which may be related to social contract theory. In a contractual relationship, we have two presumed equals, each of whom may agree to be bound in some way (accept restrictions on freedom of action) for future gain, and will have certain forms of forced compliance or sanctions for infringement built into those restrictions. The model of the social contract is that of two selfish and consensual adults, not one parent and one child.