“1. Acknowledge someone else`s direct use of words. 2. Recognize any paraphrases of someone else`s words. 3. Acknowledge the direct use of someone else`s idea. 4. Confirm a source if your own analysis or conclusion is based on that source. 5. Confirm a source if your idea about legal advice comes from a source other than the opinion itself. This section provides examples of the different types of plagiarism listed above.
First, read excerpts from two original sources, a law article and a case, both of which address the issue of whether searching the contents of a laptop transported across a border into the United States without reasonably suspecting that the computer contains evidence of a crime constitutes an illegal search that violates an individual`s right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Second, read sentences written by a lawyer on the same subject who also read these original sources but did not correctly attribute one or both sources, resulting in plagiarism. But even in its limited role, the approval has provoked sharp criticism. (For a good overview, see Simmons 1979, 57-100; for a qualified defense, see Beran 1987.) These focus on the questions of whether it actually exists and, if given, whether it would bind. Consent is not mere consensus or consent; It is a performative commitment that assumes a commitment through the act of consent itself. However, as with other promises and oaths, there are limits to its validity. We must ensure that consent is not revoked by mistake, coercion or coercion. It must also respect the limits of its validity in terms of content.
Locke argues that one cannot accept being killed, and therefore not slavery, and therefore nothing that amounts to slavery, including absolute government. One can think of an argument similar to the conclusion that political consent must be revocable. But as we build under all these conditions of validity, the commitment itself seems to do less and less work. Pitkin thinks he becomes “essentially irrelevant” in Locke`s version (Pitkin 1965, 57). Approval is saved from irrelevance only if we can explain why we value the power of committing to obedience. David Hume could not think of any reason: keeping one`s promises is an “artificial virtue” that serves the common good, just like obedience to the law. As long as the law is reasonably legitimate – and Hume is prepared to give it a very large place – a promise to keep is superfluous, because any plausible answer to the question of why we are bound by the promise would have “immediately, without any cycle, taken into account our obligation of fidelity”; “Since we are of equal power and authority, we gain nothing by dissolving one into the other” (Hume 1985, 481). However, a theory of consent does not have to “dissolve” fidelity into a promise – there may also be non-culpable conditions for obedience – but it must explain why it should depend on it. Three types of arguments were popular. First, there are good reasons for wanting a conscious control of responsibility for legal obligations.
In political authority, where the stakes are as high as they come, the power to give and refuse consent fulfills a function of ultimate protection beyond what we might expect from the fallible institutions of limited government. Second, consent allows people to build political loyalties by creating new political societies or joining existing ones, without waiting for the gradual emergence of community ties and reciprocity; Consent is an immediate passport to “perfect membership” in a Commonwealth. (Locke: § 119). Third, although consent is defined by its performative character, it is naturally accompanied by complementary non-performative characteristics: consent also expresses acceptance, or at least approval, of the government. This may mark approval leaders as important among a number of potential competitors, and it may indicate that they have a good chance of being effective, which in itself is a necessary condition for justifying any political authority. Whatever else they do, all legal systems recognize, create, modify and enforce obligations. This is no coincidence: obligations are at the heart of the social role of law, and their explanation is necessary to understand the authority of law and, therefore, its essence. There are not only obligations in the law, there are also obligations under the law. Historically, most philosophers have agreed that these include a moral obligation of obedience, or what is generally referred to as a “political obligation.” Proactive activists argued that this required something like voluntary submission to the rules of the law, for example by consent.
Non-voluntarists have denied this, insisting that the value of a fair and effective legal system is sufficient to validate the law`s claims. Both arguments have recently come under scrutiny, and some philosophers now deny that the law is entitled to all the authority it claims for itself, even if the legal system is legitimate and reasonably just. From this point of view, there are legal obligations to which some legal entities have no moral obligation. When choosing sources, decide whether you want to use primary sources, secondary sources, or a combination of primary and secondary sources. As a general rule, primary sources that are laws are more credible and persuasive than secondary sources that are comments or analyses of the law. See Amy E. Sloan, Basic Legal Research: Tools and Strategies 4-6 (4th ed. 2009). However, know the purpose you are writing for and your audience. For example, if you`re writing a court brief or an internal memo to a law firm partner, you`re likely to use primary sources primarily because the judge or lawyer wants to know what law governs a particular client`s situation and precedent, unless the issue is new or very specific. However, if you are writing an academic paper, such as a sessional paper, you may be more inclined to use a combination of primary and secondary sources.
Choose the authority that will help you articulate your views clearly and effectively. Also, refer to this authority appropriately. For example, when discussing a court opinion in your document, do not cite a secondary source; Instead, quote the court`s opinion directly. Similarly, if you refer to multiple cases in a sentence (for example, “. The courts have ruled. “), then the reader will expect quotes on more than one case. Make sure that the authority used in a quote matches the content of the sentence you wrote. The basis of Rawls` theory necessarily becomes evident when we examine what it might be for a just institution to “apply to us.” A.J. Simmons argues persuasively that an Institute for the Advancement of Philosophers cannot benefit us, even if it is right, and then requires us to pay its dues (Simmons 1979, 148). He therefore suggests that a normatively relevant sense of application requires accepting benefits – but that means transforming a natural mandatory account into a weakly voluntarist account like equity.
(See below, § 5.3.) Jeremy Waldron diagnoses the power of such counter-examples as a consequence of the fact that the Institute, although functioning, is not something whose activities are required by the judiciary: they are optional, not necessary (Waldron 1993). This seems to be true; But if we then limit the realm of authority to necessity, we will again leave many legal obligations behind. Many of the activities of a legitimate government are voluntary. It must protect us from the state of nature, but the ambitions of the law are more ambitious than that. It also does things that are permitted but not necessary: it decrees residential zones, declares official languages, establishes national holidays, supports education and the arts, and creates honours. And in the service of what is prescribed out of necessity, the law draws lines and sets standards that are themselves only permissible – an age of consent, an acceptable degree of imposition of risk, formalities for wills and marriages, etc. – what Thomas Aquinas called “determinations” of just requirements.